Using a rational bubble framework, a future spot price bubble can be shown to induce explosive behaviour in current long maturity futures prices under particular conditions.
Introduction
The boom in commodity prices more generally, and crude oil prices in particular, since the early 2000s and their remarkable collapse in late 2008, has sparked interest in both academic and policy circles. 1 In an influential paper, Tang and Xiong (2012) argue that increasing index investment in commodities markets since early 2000s has caused the futures prices of different commodities in the US to comove together. This was especially the case for the commodities in the two popular Goldman Sachs (GSCI) and Dow Jones (DJ-UBS) commodity indices, in both of which crude oil is a prominent component. Commodities were identified as a distinct investment category by fund managers and also began to comove positively with equity markets. Tang and Xiong argue that this reflects the financialisation of commodities markets and can explain many aspects of the recent synchronized price boom and bust of seemingly unrelated commodities.
Despite widespread agreement that institutional investor interest in commodities increased sharply in the early 2000s, there is no consensus on whether this altered the functioning of markets or contributed significantly to price behaviour in the [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] price run-up and subsequent collapse. Many attribute the boom-bust price changes to fundamental supply factors such as disruptions to production and/or to demand factors. In particular, proponents of the fundamental view have focused on the rapid growth of large emerging markets like China and India, fuelling a boom in demand for commodities and leading to the spike in commodity prices before the summer of 2008 1 This boom and bust cycle in commodity markets also caused serious concerns among practitioners and policy makers that excessive speculation might have been the main driver of rising energy and food prices (see, for example, Masters, 2008; Soros, 2008 ; US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2006) . In response, the US Congress passed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that aimed, inter alia, at preventing excessive speculative influences on prices.
(see for example, Krugman, 2008; Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2009; and Irwin and Sanders, 2011) . Prices subsequently fell sharply with the onset of the world recession. Others such as Masters (2008) argue that institutional investors 2 have contributed towards the deviation of commodity prices from their fundamental values leading to a speculative bubble that popped in late 2008.
The recent literature is more nuanced and addresses the question of whether the huge financial inflows caused by financialisation may have induced some commodity price changes. Singleton (2014) posits that informational frictions and associated speculative activity may induce prices to drift away from their fundamental values and may result in commodity price booms and busts within a rational differences of opinion framework. 3 He presents new evidence that there were economically and statistically significant effects of investor flows on futures prices after controlling for a number of standard factors. The largest impacts on futures prices were from the growth in commodity fund index positions and institutional spread positions and these operated through risk or informational channels. He also established that hedge fund trading in futures spread positions impacted the shape of the term structure of oil futures prices. This paper presents new evidence that directly relates to Singleton's findings. Its first contribution is that it formally tests the Singleton hypothesis that prices tend to drift away from their fundamental values employing recently developed bubble tests. A series of such tests is applied to examine the null hypothesis that there is no bubble in spot and futures oil prices using contracts along the yield curve with maturities of up to twenty four months. It is this novel examination of whether bubbles emerge in different segments of the futures yield curve which is at the core of the paper. Subsequently, it applies the recent bubble dating strategy of Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013) to take into account the possibility of multiple bubbles. This strategy consistently estimates the origination and collapse dates of each bubble even when they are of different magnitudes. Our empirical analysis produces some striking results. Firstly, using monthly data for the sample period September 1995 to December 2013, the results indicate that all series exhibited extended periods of bubble behaviour that ended in late 2008. Secondly, the dating algorithm shows that the bubbles in longer-dated contracts started much earlier, in some cases as early as 2004, and thus were longer lasting than the bubble in the spot contract. The findings are qualitatively similar at the weekly data frequency. The earlier development of bubbles in distant contracts can be considered as a price-disconnect between spot and futures markets. Although our theory points to rational bubbles as a possible explanation, we remain agnostic as to the cause and note that such bubbles could be underpinned by information frictions, differences of opinion, limits to arbitrage, excess speculation, or time-varying discount factors (see Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2012; Singleton, 2014; .
In a recent study of single bubble testing procedures, Harvey, Leybourne, Sollis, and Taylor (2015) show that changes in the unconditional variance might cause the spurious finding of a bubble in the corresponding price series. Since the volatility of crude oil futures contracts may have increased around 2004, we test for structural breaks in the unconditional variance. 4 Evidence of breaks is found and therefore the 4 We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. Harvey et al. (2015) bootstrap procedure is subsequently applied. 5 The results suggest that our original bubble findings are robust.
The second contribution is that our analysis of the crude oil futures yield curve over the [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] and Shi and Arora (2012) find a short-lived bubble in spot oil prices over the period March to July 2008. Moreover, show a potential transmission mechanism: the bubble behaviour in commodity markets appears to have migrated from the housing market. 6 The final contribution is that the findings may have practical policy implications.
Our results raise the possibility that relevant information about potential future spot price bubbles may be gleaned from longer-dated futures prices. Bubble tests on long maturity oil futures contracts may prove useful for real-time monitoring and early warning signals for bubble formation. To provide a theoretical basis for such an investigation, this paper first outlines a rational bubble approach where it shows that, under particular conditions, an expectation of a spot price bubble in the future will generate explosive behaviour in the relevant futures prices prior to the appearance of the spot price bubble.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background on the price-bubble relationship for storable commodities. Section 3 describes the econometric approach for testing for rational bubbles and date stamping.
Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5 whilst a final section concludes.
The theory of rational bubbles in commodity markets
We follow Diba and Grossman (1988b) and explain the price change of storable commodities by changes in expected future net payoffs defined as 'fundamentals'. The current spot price of a commodity, , is determined by the present value of next period's expected spot price, [ +1 ], and the marginal convenience yield, :
where [. ] denotes the expectation conditional on the information at time and is a time invariant interest rate. The net of storage cost marginal convenience yield measures the benefit from holding inventories per unit of commodity over the period to + 1 and is analogous to the dividend on a stock. Under the theory of storage it should satisfy the standard no arbitrage condition:
where 1, denotes the futures price at time for delivery of a commodity at + 1. If and are both integrated processes, the series are cointegrated with specific cointegrating vector [1, −1/ ] (see Campbell and Shiller, 1987) . Solving (2) for 1, and re-arranging, it follows that the difference between contemporaneous futures and spot prices is the interest forgone in storing the commodity over the period to + 1, less the marginal convenience yield.
Solving the difference Equation (1) forward and applying the law of iterated expectations, yields:
Imposing the transversality condition, lim →∞ [(1 + ) − + ] = 0, eliminates the last term in (3). It follows that the price collapses to the discounted sum of expected future payoffs, i.e. the fundamental value which will be denoted by . However, if the transversality condition does not hold, there are infinitely many solutions to (3) that take the form:
where is a bubble component that has to satisfy:
In other words, the bubble has to grow over time at a rate in order for investors agree to hold the asset (see Blanchard and Watson, 1982) . Diba and Grossman (1988a) argue that rational bubbles cannot be negative. If a bubble is negative, then when it erupts, it could make the price of the security negative also. In addition, if = 0 (5) implies that +1 = 0 with probability 1. It follows that the existence of bubbles would be consistent with rationality only when > 0.
Taken together, Equations (1) and (2) imply that the futures price is an unbiased predictor of the future spot price
Given the decomposition of the spot price in (4), it follows that the contemporaneous futures price with maturity + embodies information about the expected value of the bubble component over the period to + :
In line with (5), the bubble is expected to grow exponentially at rate , i.e.
[ + ]
contains the root (1 + ) that is greater than unity. If the bubble erupts at some future time + , for 1 < < , it will induce explosive behaviour in the price series of futures contracts with maturity greater than + .
To test for rational bubbles in the stock market, Diba and Grossman (1988b) motivate the use of stationarity tests. However, Evans (1991) suggests that this approach would not efficiently detect periods of explosive behaviour if bubbles collapse periodically. Consistent with the process in (5), he considers bubbles described by:
where 0 < < (1 + ) , +1 is a positive iid variable with [ +1 ] = 1, and {•} is an indicator function that assumes a value of 1 when the condition in the braces is true and 0 otherwise. +1 is an iid Bernoulli process and the probability of +1 = 0 is (1 − ) 8 and +1 = 1 is , where 0 < < 1. Such a bubble would start to grow at a rate (1 + ) −1 once it exceeds some threshold level , but with a probability (1 − ) the bubble will collapse to an expected mean level . Since a bubble never collapses to zero, it will start growing again without violating the non-negativity constraint given in Diba and Grossman (1988a) .
The non-linear bubble process in (8) causes the data series to exhibit global characteristics similar to a stationary process. As a result, conventional unit root tests applied to the full sample would lack power, failing to adequately to test the null hypothesis of no bubbles. suggest the application of a unit root test in a recursive window framework to overcome this drawback. Their approach allows the test statistics to be time dependent and therefore is able to detect explosive behaviour in time series even when bubbles are periodically collapsing.
3 Testing for mildly explosive behaviour
Bubble tests
Suppose we observe the sequence { } =1 and estimate the following autoregression:
where is white noise, is a fraction of the total sample and ⌊ ⌋ denotes the integer part of . The recursive window of the regression expands forward by one observation at a time from some initial sample ⌊ 0 ⌋. Consistent with , tests adopted in our empirical analysis are performed under the null that the time series contains a unit root at every :
Under the alternative hypothesis, specify a data generating process where the series starts as a unit root but switches to a regime of mildly explosive behaviour ( is greater than unity but still in its vicinity) at date ⌊ ⌋ until ⌊ ⌋. At date ⌊ ⌋ the series returns to a unit root regime. The model is defined as:
where = 1 + − with > 0 and ∈ (0,1), and ⌊ ⌋ * = ⌊ ⌋ + (1).
The restrictions on the parameter and values of over the specified open interval yield the mildly explosive process discussed in Magdalinos (2007a, 2007b) . The boundary as → 1 includes the local to unity case where defining a bubble period is not possible (see ).
Phillips at al. (2011) suggest the application of the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-
statistics to the recursive autoregression in (9) to test the null hypothesis of a unit root or no bubbles. The test statistic is given as:
where 0 is the ADF statistic from (9) evaluated between = 1 and = ⌊ ⌋. Homm and Breitung (2012) propose a similar procedure, but under the assumption that a break in the autoregressive coefficient occurs at observation ⌊ ⌋.
The model is written as:
The null hypothesis 0 : = 0 is then tested against the alternative 1 : > 0 by using the supremum of a sequence of backward recursive Chow tests. Specifically, the test statistic is the following:
where
and
and δ τ is the least squares estimator of from Equation (13). Homm and Breitung (2012) also motivate the use of Busetti-Taylor statistics on the assumption that the series has a unit root up to observation ⌊ ⌋ after which it switches to a regime of explosive behaviour. Using a random walk model to forecast the final value from the periods ⌊ ⌋ , ⌊ ⌋+1 , … , −1 should result in a large sum of squared forecast errors. The modified version of the statistic is given by:
, and 0 , are the OLS residuals from the regression of Δ on an intercept, = 1, … , , whilst 1 , are the OLS residuals from the regression of ( − −1 ) on an intercept, = ⌊ ⌋ + 1, … , . Evidence against the null hypothesis of no bubble in all of the above tests is obtained by comparing the sup statistics with the corresponding right-sided critical values from the limit distribution. However, the above procedures do not facilitate the identification of the explosive period. In doing so, it is desirable to set some minimum duration for this bubble period to successfully to discriminate between bubbles and short-lived blips.
The bubble dating algorithm
Techniques that can help identify bubble periods are useful as a real-time monitoring procedures and early warning signals for bubble formation. They also overcome some weaknesses of the suggested tests above. For example, the ( 0 ) and ( They show that this procedure is more efficient when multiple bubbles are present in the data. The generalized test statistic is:
To estimate the fraction points for the origination and collapse points of the bubble, Phillips et al. (2013) recommend using a backward sup ADF test to improve dating accuracy. In essence, this is an ( 0 ) test on a backward increasing sample in which the endpoint ⌊ 2 ⌋ is fixed and the initial observation changes over the region = 1 and = ⌊ 2 − 0 ⌋. The backward ( 0 ) test can therefore be written:
and the origination and collapse points: observations. It should be noted that ln ( ) is the minimum duration necessary for a part of the series to qualify as a bubble period. The parameter is chosen based on the sampling frequency so that periods shorter than ⌊ ln ( ) ⌋ observations are considered insignificant (see . Finally, it can be seen that the date stamping methodology above, based on the backward sup ADF test, corresponds to the ( 0 ) as:
Data and sample characteristics
Daily WTI crude oil prices for the spot and futures contracts on NYMEX were downloaded from DataStream for the period September 1995 to December 2013. The starting date of the sample was dictated by the availability of data for longer-dated contracts from 15 to 24 months. In fact, data were collected for futures contracts with a range of maturities along the yield curve including 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 and 24 months. It should be noted that NYMEX crude oil futures usually expire on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month preceding the delivery month.
For the empirical analysis, a monthly series of 220 observations for each spot and associated nine futures contracts was constructed using closing daily prices on the last business day of each month. As an aid to explanation, Table 1 summarises the relationship between the selected price of contract j (i.e., , ) and its expiration and delivery month, for the first observation of the sample at = 1.
[ Table 1 around here]
Remembering that our sample begins in September 1995, Table 1 shows that on the last business day of that month, the contract that expires the following month provides the price for observation ( 1,1 ). Likewise, on that same day, the contract that expires in three months provides the price for observation ( 3,1 ). The first observation for contract maturities 6 to 24 months is analogously collected. The data are sampled monthly, and therefore as we move forward to the last business day of October, we collect the prices ( 1,2 ), ( 3,2 ) and so on. In this manner, our constant maturity series are constructed. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of log returns for both spot and futures contracts over the full 1995-2013 sample in Panel A and three non-overlapping subsamples.
[ Table 2 (2012) and Cheng and Xiong (2014) that stress that investors' risk-bearing capacity and thus their appetite for risk sharing vary over time.
In particular, their reduced risk appetite during crises may lead them to unwind their positions rather than take on extra risk.
Empirical results

Bubble test results
As noted earlier, the power of the with their empirical analysis, we set the lag order to zero for the ( 0 ) test to lower the probability of a type 1 error.
The recursive regressions were run with an initial window size of 44 observations (20% of the total sample) due to the sample size. The test results are given in Panel A of Table 3 whilst Panel B provides various right-sided critical values.
[ Table 3 around here]
An analysis of the results in the Table 3 leads to several conclusions. First, all statistics for the spot price series readily reject the null hypothesis of no bubbles at the 1% level.
Second, all statistics for all of the futures price series also provide evidence against the null hypothesis of no bubble at the 1% level. This result is novel and is one of the original findings of this study. Finally, the evidence supporting bubbles becomes stronger as the maturity of futures contracts increases. These patterns are consistent with the positive sample excess kurtosis and negative skewness that we observe in Table 2 . Bubbles will contribute towards positive price changes during the boom phase and large negative price changes during the bust phase. Such a positive feedback mechanism will cause the mass of the probability distribution to be more concentrated on the right with fatter tails than a normally distributed variable (see, inter alios, Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Camerer, 1989) .
The support for bubbles in the spot and nearby futures is generally consistent 
Date stamping the bubbles
Whilst Table 3 provides strong evidence of bubbles, they need to be date stamped. We summarise in Figure 3 the bubble periods at the 10% significance level.
[ Figure 3 around here]
In contrast to the results in contracts is interesting from a macro-prudential perspective. The evidence in this paper suggests that central banks could usefully employ bubble tests on longer maturity crude oil futures prices as part of an early warning system for detecting overheating in commodity and financial markets.
Robustness checks
Breaks in unconditional volatility
The results so far suggest that longer-dated futures contracts have exhibited bubble behaviour since early 2004, which also marks the beginning of the financialisation of commodity futures markets. However, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 Following Rapach et al. (2008) and Vivian and Wohar (2012) , we employ a modified version of the cumulative sum of squares statistic suggested by Inclàn and Tiao (1994) .
, so that the statistic is given by: , and the lag truncation parameter is selected as in Newey and West (1994) . Because of the non-parametric adjustment, the statistic has been shown to possess good size properties even when * is characterised by some form of temporal dependencies like autocorrelation or autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (see Sansò et al., 2004) . To allow for multiple breaks in the variance, we apply the iterative algorithm described in Steps 0-3 in Inclàn and Tiao (1994, p.916) and employ the statistic.
The break dates are depicted in Figure 4 along with the full-sample graph for each price series.
[ Figure Currently in the literature we do not have a non-stationary variance correction for the multiple bubble tests used in this paper. Therefore, as an approximation, we apply the bootstrap algorithm suggested by Harvey et al. (2015, p.11) to the single bubble SADF(r 0 ) statistic defined in (12). 7 The results are summarised in Table 4. [ Table 4 around here]
Compared to the non-bootstrapped results in Table 3 , unsurprisingly in Table 4 , we find slightly weaker evidence of bubbles in the shorter-dated contracts even if the rejection is marginal at the 5% significance level in most cases. Nevertheless, all series exhibited bubble behaviour at the 10% significance level, whereas for longer-dated contracts (i.e.
contracts 21 and 24) the test statistic is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, even allowing for non-stationary variance, the robustness results in this section support our baseline findings of bubbles in oil price series.
Weekly frequency
Finally, we examine the effect of data frequency on the bubble periods that we have identified. Using the same logic as with the monthly data, we create weekly series by taking Tuesday's settlement price for each maturity. 8 In particular, we roll over contracts on the last business day of the month prior to nearby expiration to create continuous series with a reasonably constant maturity. The bubble test results are reported in Table 5 .
[ Table 5 around here]
Consistent with the results in Table 3 , each test statistic is significant at the 1% level and the evidence for bubbles becomes even stronger as the maturity of the contracts increases. The bubble periods identified by the date-stamping strategy are depicted in Figures 5 and 6 for the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
[ Figures 5 and 6 around here] Again, the results are consistent with the bubble periods depicted in Figures 2 and 3 .
Overall, the finding that longer-dated futures contracts may serve as an early warning system for bubble detection in the spot market appears robust at the weekly frequency also. For completeness, we also apply the unconditional variance break test and the Harvey et al. (2015) test to our weekly series. The results of the former can be seen in Table 6 and the latter in Table 7 .
[ Table 6 around here]
[ Table 7 around here]
The results in Table 6 suggest that more breaks are found in weekly, as opposed to monthly data. Given the additional noise in weekly data, it is perhaps unsurprising that the results in Table 7 provide less evidence for bubbles than monthly counterparts.
However, it is striking that 8 of the 10 series still suggest a bubble at the 10% level.
Discussion
The GSADF data stamping results indicate strong evidence of bubbles commencing in The period from January to June was employed for 2008. 10 The mild contango at shorter maturities in 2005 may reflect hedge funds front-running the Goldman roll (see Mou, 2011). funds are generally recognised as sophisticated institutional investors. Their trading activities should correct for any price deviations from fundamental levels and contribute towards market efficiency, preventing the occurrence of bubbles (see Fama, 1965 ). Contrary to the efficient market prospective, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider an economy where rational agents would deliberately allow bubbles to persist.
Hedge funds may have been aware of the mispricing of long-dated futures but could have opted to benefit from it in the short run rather than correct it.
Alternatively, Allen and Gorton (1993) provide a model in which a bubble arises in rational expectations equilibrium because of institutional investors' agency problem.
Portfolio managers' payoffs have the form of a call option which will induce them to speculate on the future asset price path. In this context, our results are consistent with the existence of excess speculation in futures markets but can offer no definitive evidence on causality.
The contrasting results on bubbles for the spot and nearby contracts and those for the longer-dated futures contracts point to a potential disconnect between prices and fundamentals in the crude oil market. One possibility is that this might be driven by the tests is that when applied to the full sample and the data are described by the generating process in Equation (11), with a coefficient close to but greater than one, the unit root null hypothesis cannot be properly assessed. Evans (1991) showed that periodically collapsing bubble processes behave like an I(1) process and full-sample unit root tests have low power.
A final possibility is that the increase in crude oil spot and futures prices might be due to changes in expected fundamentals. 11 This type of rationale is given by Balke and Wohar (2001) for the stock price run-up in the 1990s. They show that after World War II, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios were quite persistent and subject to structural breaks. In this scenario, fundamentals can have a significant effect on price changes and even make price series appear explosive whilst adjusting towards the new equilibrium. They conclude that the 1990s stock price run-up can be rationalised by a combination of increasing expected real dividend ( Finally, our results have pertinent policy implications. Since bubbles appear earlier in longer dated futures contracts, they suggest that these contracts may provide additional information, over and above that of the more examined shorter-dated alternatives. Bubble tests on long maturity crude oil futures contracts may prove useful both for real-time monitoring and in terms of providing potential early warning signals for bubble formation. Thus evidence on bubbles in long maturity oil futures contracts could form an input into macro-prudential policy for a bubble early warning system. 
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Figure 4: Volatility breaks
Unconditional volatility break dates are summarised along with the price series of each contract.
The vertical line represents the structural break point in the unconditional variance of each corresponding series. We use a response surface as in Sansò et al. (2004) 
